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Many democratic systems explicitly recognise and accommodate the 
interests of particular ethnic groups within their decision procedures.  
This is true, for example, of the democratic system established under 
the terms of the Belfast Agreement.  But the question remains as to 
whether those systems leave sufficient space for the recognition and 
accommodation of other kinds of political interests.  In this article, I 
seek to explore this question with respect to the political interests of 
women, understood in relational terms.  To this end, I defend a 
particular reading of the value of personal autonomy.  Having shown 
how that principle relates to the value of political equality, I then show 
how it might be realised and applied by women along three different 
dimensions.  Finally, I use this elaboration of the principle of personal 
autonomy as a means of evaluating the democratic quality of Northern 
Ireland’s electoral system and Assembly decision rules.   
 
 
Under the terms of the Belfast Agreement (Agreement, 1998), Northern Ireland has 
sought to address its political problems by building democratic institutions that enable 
British unionists and Irish nationalists to share power.  Although power sharing marks 
a significant shift away from the more usual majoritarian model of democracy, the 
thinking behind this shift is easy to appreciate.  The fairness of the majoritarian model 
depends in large measure on the assumption that majority rule will not result in 
permanent majorities and permanent minorities—since majorities and minorities can 
be expected to alternate over the course of time, no group need fear being 
permanently excluded from the government (Jones, 1983: 168).  Yet no such 
assumption can be expected to hold in the context of a deeply divided society such as 
Northern Ireland—since ethnic groups tend to line up squarely behind their own 
political parties, voting patterns tend to be relatively stable or unchanging.  
Consequently, deeply divided societies must opt for power sharing over 
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majoritarianism so that minority ethnic groups will have at least some opportunity to 
participate in the government (but see Barry, 1975: 405). 
 
The democratic institutions established under the terms of the Agreement not only 
enable unionists and nationalists to share power, but, in so doing, place unionist and 
nationalist interests firmly at the heart of Northern Irish politics (O’Leary, 1999: 76).  
Yet although many people in Northern Ireland care a great deal about the future of the 
union with Great Britain or about the prospects for a united Ireland, many people also 
care a great deal about political issues that do not, or at least need not, have anything 
to do with unionism or nationalism.  The question remains, however, as to whether a 
political system that is built principally around the need to recognise and 
accommodate the interests of two conflicting ethnic groups can also leave sufficient 
space for the recognition and accommodation of other kinds of political interests 
within its decision procedures.  In this article, I take up this question with respect to 
women’s interests, such as they might be.  More specifically, I ask whether the 
power-sharing institutions established under the terms of the Agreement treat those 
interests fairly or whether they discount those interests in ways that should give 
democrats cause for concern. 
 
Now, at first sight, one might think that the answer to this question is obvious: since 
the Agreement recognises and accommodates the interests of two ethnic groups, and 
since all ethnic groups are patriarchal, the Agreement must inevitably fail to provide 
sufficient space for the recognition and accommodation of women’s interests (Okin, 
1997; Yuval-Davis 1998).  Of course, it would be hard to deny that ethnic groups tend 
to be patriarchal to one extent or another.  Yet it still need not follow that the 
Agreement treats women’s interests unfairly, since much will depend on how ethnic 
interests are actually framed and institutionalised within its decision procedures (see 
Kymlicka, 1997: 30).  At a more philosophical level, we cannot simply say that the 
Agreement treats women’s interests unfairly until we have first decided which 
democratic standards ought properly to apply in making evaluative judgements of this 
sort. 
 
In this article, then, I will proceed as follows.  First, I will argue that women’s 
interests are best understood in relational rather than essentialist terms.  However, a 
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relational understanding brings problems of its own, since there are always limits to 
the number of interests that can be recognised and accommodated within any given 
set of decision procedures.  Secondly, I will argue that although the circumstances of 
politics are such that interests must inevitably be prioritised, that prioritisation should 
not be arbitrary from the moral point of view.  Instead, it should be directed in the 
light of clearly defined and soundly justified democratic standards.  To this end, I 
defend a particular reading of the principle of personal autonomy and suggest 
different ways in which women might put that principle into practice.  Finally, in the 
light of this treatment of the principle of personal autonomy, I evaluate a number of 
the core institutions established under the terms of the Belfast Agreement (the 
electoral system and parliamentary decision rules).  I conclude that, as far as the 
recognition and accommodation of women’s interests in Northern Ireland is 
concerned, the evidence is mixed.  
 
Before proceeding, two points are worth noting.  First, although this article is 
concerned with questions of institutional design, it is not explicitly concerned with 
offering positive proposals for remedying the problems that it identifies.  Feminists 
have already offered a range of proposals of this of this latter sort, highlighting the 
important role that might be played by instruments and mechanisms such as candidate 
quotas, reserved seats, equality legislation and bills of rights (e.g., Young, 1990; 
Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1998, Mansbridge, 1999).  Yet the fact remains that the 
appropriateness and utility of those instruments and mechanisms depends on prior 
normative and empirical assessments of the space for women’s interests within 
particular institutional designs.  Secondly, although this article is concerned with the 
recognition and accommodation of different and sometimes competing interests, not 
all interests on a par.  In particular, a democratic government can have little truck with 
interests that are inimical to democracy or injurious to its members, no matter whose 
interests they are or why it is they hold them.  For the purposes of this article, I will 
simply assume that interests of this injurious sort are not at issue. 
 
Conceptualising women’s interests 
 
Naturally, it is important to begin by explaining how women’s interests should be 
understood, since different explanations can have different implications for our 
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assessment of the fairness or otherwise of any given set of democratic decision 
procedures.  Here, in this section, I consider two possible explanations: essentialist 
and relational.  I argue that the essentialist understanding is both ontologically flawed 
and democratically suspect.  By contrast, I argue that a relational understanding offers 
a much more ontologically defensible conceptualisation of women’s interests, 
although, as we will also see, it poses a number of difficult democratic questions of its 
own. 
 
On an essentialist reading, women’s interests are traced to an underlying nature in 
which all women, simply because they are women, share.  For example, Carol 
Gilligan suggests that women’s interests can be grounded in their natural capacity for 
nurturing (Gilligan, 1982).  Yet, as most contemporary feminists openly accept, the 
trouble with essentialist approaches of this sort is that many women simply do not fit 
the proposed accounts of what it is to be a woman (e.g., Phillips, 1995: 68).  Some 
women may see themselves as nurturers, and hence have strong feelings of 
connectedness to and sense of responsibility for others.  In turn, those feelings may 
colour the interests that they hold more generally.  But other women may feel nothing 
of the sort: their fundamental sense of what it means to be a woman may be very 
different, bound up with very different life experiences and reflected in very different 
interests and concerns.   
 
Insofar as different women’s interests cannot be traced to a single underlying nature, 
an essentialist understanding of those interests must be considered ontologically 
flawed: it does not provide a coherent account of the lived social reality of women in 
general.  Of course, it might be responded that although essentialism might be 
ontologically flawed, it nevertheless captures the way in which many women actually 
perceive their interests: although there may be no such thing as an underlying nature 
to which each and every interest can be traced, some women believe that such a 
nature exists.  Such claims are democratically suspect, however.  Among other things, 
democracy entails the view that no one has the right to have their demands met or 
their interests satisfied without first justifying those interests in ways that others can 
understand and in principle accept.  But if the essential nature to which you point has 
no meaning for me, it hard to see why I should be persuaded by the claims that you 
make on both of us (Barry, 2006: 22-3).  To insist on those interests nonetheless, 
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simply because you think that they have arisen from some natural, pre-political 
source, is to fail to treat me as your equal. 
 
Thus, the decisive factor that counts against essentialist approaches is that many 
women simply cannot think about their interests in such reductive terms (Young, 
1997: 387).  Nor, from a democratic point of view, should they be required to do so.  
By contrast, I want to suggest that a relational understanding provides a far more 
plausible way of conceptualising women’s interests.  But as I will also suggest, 
although essentialist claims are democratically suspect, a relational understanding 
poses democratic problems of its own. 
 
On a relational understanding, we cannot make sense of the idea that the members of 
group A have a distinct interest in a given issue except in relation to how the members 
of an opposing group, B, see that issue.  (In the absence of group B, the members of 
group A might not even be aware that they have a distinct interest in the issue.)  
Accordingly, when women qua women say that they have a distinct interest in issues 
such as childbearing, domestic violence or occupational mobility, this should not be 
understood as a claim about the centrality of those interests to their nature as women, 
but simply as a claim about how their experiences of childbearing, domestic violence 
and employment differ from those of men.  Admittedly, some women do not have 
children or suffer domestic abuse, and we know that some women make it to the top 
of their profession.  But since those women have their own particular experiences and 
perspectives, their interests should be understood not just in relation to those of men 
but also in relation to those of other women (Young, 1997: 389; Young, 2000: 99; cf.  
Phillips, 1995: 67-8).   
 
Ontologically, the beauty of a relational approach is that it allows us to account for the 
different interests that different groups of women may or may not have, if and when 
they have them.  Unlike an essentialist understanding, which is ontologically rigid, a 
relational understanding is inherently flexible.  It treats membership in a social group 
not as a matter of satisfying some purportedly objective criteria, but, in Iris Young’s 
words, as a matter ‘of a subjective affirmation of affinity with that group, the 
affirmation of that affinity by other members of the group, and the attribution of 
membership in that group by persons identifying with other groups’ (Young, 1990: 
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172).  In other words, on a relational conceptualisation, groups are composed of 
people who see the world in a similar way and who feel a certain affinity for one 
another because (among other things) they hold certain interests in common.  Of 
course, our sense of affinity with those others can, and often will, wax and wane over 
time—as we change as people, our sense of what is of concern to us in life will 
change also, along with the relations in which we stand to others.  There is nothing 
unusual about this shifting social process.  But, as far as democratic decision making 
is concerned, it can make the recognition and accommodation of women’s interests a 
highly complex affair.   
 
If our interests are those things that we take to be of particular concern to us, then 
women have many different, and sometimes competing, interests.  In the kinds of 
deeply divided societies with which this article is concerned, women will often 
oppose one another along ethnic or national lines—for instance, women qua unionists 
and women qua nationalists disagree fundamentally on the issue of the constitutional 
status of Northern Ireland.  But those same women may simultaneously view 
themselves as sharing certain affinities that cut across the ethnic divide.  They may 
share a distinct gendered interest in the kinds of issues that I mentioned above 
(childbearing, domestic violence, occupational mobility, and so forth).  But they may 
also share a distinct gendered interest in being able to challenge dominant 
interpretations of ethnicity from within, especially in those cases where dominant 
interpretations are highly patriarchal or where they create unwanted expectations 
about how women ought to behave or what their proper role ought to be (Appiah, 
1994: 160-63).  
 
Now, if an essentialist understanding tends to reduce the number of women’s 
interests, a relational approach tends to multiply them (and perhaps multiply them 
exponentially).  In this sense, a relational understanding magnifies the basic challenge 
that all democracies must confront, namely to design a fair procedure for deciding 
which interests will find their way into public policy and which will not.  This 
challenge has both normative and empirical dimensions (Habermas, 1994: 124-25).  
In order to know whether a democratic decision procedure is fair or unfair, we must 
first have some appreciation of the values and standards against which that decision 
procedure should measured.  But we must also know something about the political 
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context in which that procedure has to operate, since conditions on the ground must 
also inform our evaluation of it (Goodin and Pettit, 1993: 1).  After all, it makes no 
sense to say we ought to do something unless we can actually do it: ought implies can, 
as every philosopher knows. 
 
No doubt the need to balance normative and empirical consideration can be extremely 
difficult in practice.  This is especially so in deeply divided societies, where larger 
democratic goals and purposes will often have to give way in the face of harsh 
realities—ethnic interests may simply have to come first, not because they have the 
best arguments on their side, but because the alternatives might be unthinkable 
(O’Leary, 2005: 9).  And yet normative standards continue to have a vitally important 
role to play. 
 
No democracy is perfect.  Far from it.  But since democracies are not static, the hope 
is always that they can be socially, politically and even morally improved.  In this 
vein, it is often said that democracy is best understood as an ongoing learning process 
according to which we come to see that democratic standards are better satisfied if, 
for example, women have the vote or hitherto marginalised ethnic groups are brought 
in from the cold (Young, 1990: 190; Habermas, 2001: 774-75).  But in order to know 
that democratic standards are better satisfied, we must, in the first instance, have some 
appreciation of what those standards are, how they are grounded and why they are 
worth pursuing.  In the next section of this article, I focus on one such standard, 
namely the principle of personal autonomy.  As we will see, this principle has much 
to tell us about the political recognition and accommodation of women’s interests.  I 
begin the section, though, by briefly considering how this principle relates to 
democracy more generally.   
 
Democratic autonomy and women’s interests 
 
From the outset of this article, I have traded on the assumption that a democratic 
system should allow sufficient space for the recognition of women’s interests, or, 
perhaps more accurately, that a democratic system should not simply discount those 
interest as being of lesser a piori value or importance than ethnic interests.  But how 
is this assumption grounded?   
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On the face of it, we might be tempted to think that this assumption flows naturally 
from a relational understanding of group interests: the idea that group interests need to 
be understood in relation to one another seems to preclude the idea that some interests 
are antecedently privileged.  Yet the difficulty here is that ontological claims only tell 
us about the way the world is, not about the way the world ought to be—although our 
ontological commitments may colour the normative claims that we make, they need 
not determine them (Taylor, 1995: 182-85).2  Accordingly, in order to move from a 
relational understanding of women’s interests to the normative assumption that a 
democratic decision procedure should not discount those interests in advance, we 
must appeal to some intervening moral standard (see Jones, 1983: 165-66).   
 
As I define it, democracy is a procedure for making decisions in which all of those 
who are bound by the decisions have the right to participate equally in their making.  
As this definition makes clear, political equality is the central value of democracy: 
since men and women are bound by the decisions that democratic governments make, 
men and women should have an equal say in those decisions.  And so it follows that if 
men are entitled and empowered to shape their own relation to the polity (which, as an 
empirical matter, they generally are), then women must have the same general 
entitlement.  Anything less is undemocratic.   
 
Of course, the value of political equality has been interpreted to mean different things 
in different contexts.  But for many contemporary democrats, the interpretation that is 
most relevant to the democratic process is expressed in the principle of equal 
consideration of interests. That principle ‘supposes that the weaker members of a 
democratic association are entitled to the same concern and respect of their 
government as the more powerful members have secured for themselves’ (Dworkin, 
1977: 297).  Even so, democrats worry that this principle may not be enough, taken on 
its own, to secure our standing as political equals.  After all, it has often been pointed 
out that a benevolent and informed despotism could claim not only to know what was 
in your best interests, but also that it could be trusted to advance your interests as if 
they were its own (Dahl, 1989: 87-8). 
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In response, some democrat theorists argue that any convincing account of democracy 
must also involve a principle of personal autonomy which, in its most familiar 
formulation, supposes that each person should be treated as the best judges of his or 
her own interests (e.g., Mill, 1991 [1861]: 245-48; Dahl, 1989: 99).  There are good 
prudential reasons for adopting a principle of this sort.  Although democratic 
governments always claim to treat the interests of minority groups with equal 
consideration, and in many instances are actuated by a sincere desire to do so, the 
historical record nevertheless suggests that, as John Stuart Mill put it, ‘the rights and 
interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the 
person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them’ (Mill, 
1991 [1861]: 245).  Indeed, those who advocate power sharing in deeply divided 
societies take this reasoning one step further, arguing that unless representatives from 
the weaker ethnic groups are actually included, as of right, in the government, there is 
a very real danger that their interests will be depreciated or ignored (e.g., Lijphart, 
1977, 2004; Horowitz, 1985, 1991).   
 
Thus, there are good prudential grounds for thinking that the value of political 
equality should be spelt out not just in terms of a principle of equal consideration, but 
also in terms of a principle of personal autonomy.  Of course, it might be objected that 
the principle of personal autonomy is far more suited to private decisions than to 
democratic decisions, since our views about our own interests can never be decisive in 
the public realm in the way that they can be in the private realm.  But, as Robert 
Goodin enables us to see, this objection overlooks an important point, namely that 
statements of interest entail claims, not just demands:  
To say ‘I want x’ is a demand: we do not need to know why, only that 
you want x, to fully comprehend the nature of the proposition and (if 
we are in the business of want-satisfaction) to act upon it.  To say ‘it is 
in my interests that I should have x’ is to say something about the 
reasonableness of a want.  It explains, rationalises, justifies a want in 
the way that a statement of brute longing does not (Goodin, 1990: 
184). 
On this understanding, when a woman says that her experiences as a woman have led 
her to have a distinct interest in x, she is not simply saying that those experiences are 
proof enough that her interest in x should be satisfied (but see Hartsock, 1983).  
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Rather, what she is saying is that there is something about those experiences, and 
hence about the interest-claims to which they give rise, that we should find rationally 
compelling (for example, that they are the product of unjust social hierarchies created 
and maintained by men to the unfair advantage of their gender).  Of course, we might 
decide on due reflection that other claims are more compelling.  But the general point 
remains that, insofar as we are willing to treat people as the best judges of their own 
interests, we will not discount their interests in advance. 
 
Clearly, this characterisation of the principle of personal autonomy implies a very 
particular vision of democracy, one in which decision making proceeds in the first 
instance by rational discussion and deliberation rather than by bargaining or voting.  
Since I have written elsewhere on the subject of deliberative democracy in deeply 
divided societies, I will say no more about that subject here (O’Flynn, 2006; O’Flynn, 
2007).  Instead, I wish to spell out in more detail what I take this characterisation of 
the principle of personal autonomy to mean for the recognition of women’s interests. 
 
The principle of personal autonomy calls for a democratic decision procedure which 
affords women an equal say in the decisions that result.  More specifically, it calls for 
a decision process that is flexible enough to allow women to freely shape their own 
relation to the polity, consistent with a similar freedom for all.  In practical terms, 
there are two general dimensions along which this freedom (or autonomy) might be 
realised.  First, some women might view themselves as having an exclusively 
gendered interest in some given policy issue, for example, equal pay.  They might 
therefore decide to join a women’s politically party in order to pursue that interest.  Of 
course, party members might disagree internally with one another about how exactly 
they should proceed.  But when it comes to engaging externally with other political 
parties, they will, along this first dimension, see that engagement primarily as a 
challenge to patriarchal norms.3  Secondly, some women might think of themselves as 
having interests in common with men.  For example, they might see themselves as 
sharing a concern for the environment.  Those women might therefore decide to join a 
green political party in order to bring a gendered perspective to bear on that concern.  
When it comes to internal policy debates, those women may understand their interests 
in relation to those of male members.  But, regardless of whether or not their interests 
as women shape a particular policy outcome, they will, along this second dimension, 
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act first and foremost as environmentalist when it comes to engaging externally with 
other political parties.4 
 
Now, on one level, these two general dimensions along which the principle of 
personal autonomy can be put into practice pertain just as much to deeply divided 
societies as they do to more normal democratic societies.  For example, some women 
born into the unionist (or nationalist) community in Northern Ireland might think 
about their interests in wholly gendered terms and hence as independent of the 
concerns of unionism.  By contrast, some unionist women might think of themselves 
as unionists in the first instance and women in the second.  In relation to the male 
members of the unionist community, those women might challenge the development 
of party policy on, say, grounds of gender equality.  But when it comes to engaging 
externally with nationalist parties, they will typically prioritise their ethnic allegiances 
to unionism.  
 
On another level, however, it must be remembered that the members of a divided 
society tend not to think about social issues such as the environment in the same way 
as ethnic issues.  This reason why is obvious: given the legacy of protracted violent 
conflict, ethnic interests will resonate uniquely for them.  But then it seems that, as far 
as women’s interests are concerned, there are good grounds for thinking about the 
principle of personal autonomy in terms of three general dimensions of autonomous 
democratic engagement rather than two—as women in their own right (dimension 1), 
as women with a gendered interest in social (or non-ethnic) issues (dimension 2) or as 
women with a gendered perspective on ethnicity (dimension 3).  In the following 
section, I consider whether or to what extent women in Northern Ireland can 
meaningfully choose to exercise their personal autonomy along each of these three 
dimensions.   
 
Women’s autonomy in context: power-sharing in Northern Ireland 
 
In what follows, I focus on the electoral system and Assembly decision rules 
established under the terms of the Agreement.  Admittedly, a more complete analysis 
would need to consider a much broader range of issues, including human rights, 
justice and security provisions, along with their implications for cross-border relations 
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(Fearon and Rebouché, 2006: 283-87).  Yet insofar as democracy is normally thought 
of in the first instance as a decision procedure, it seems natural to begin by focusing 
on the two institutional features to which I now turn. 
 
The electoral system 
 
Northern Ireland uses the single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional 
representation (PR) to elect representatives to its 108-member parliamentary 
Assembly.  Like all PR systems, STV tends to reduce disproportionate vote-to-seat 
ratios.  It also tends to increase electoral choice, not just because its ballot structure 
allows voters to vote for any mix of candidates they prefer, for whatever reason they 
prefer them, but also because its low threshold for election encourages new political 
parties or independent candidates to run for election (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 
24-8).   
 
In theory there is reason to think that STV might serve women well along all three 
dimensions that I identified above.  Since STV operates with a low threshold for 
election, it can encourage women to stand as independent candidates, to create their 
own parties or to join social parties that might have little chance of success under 
some alternative electoral system (dimensions 1 and 2).  And since STV tends to 
increase electoral choice and hence electoral competition, it can also encourage ethnic 
parties to pay greater attention to women’s interests—for example, by including 
gender issues in their party platforms or by fielding a greater number of female 
candidates at election time (dimension 3).  Nevertheless, it might well be objected that 
matters are no way near as straightforward in practice as the appear to be in theory.  
Although STV might encourage new political parties and independent candidates, 
some of whom might seek to promote women’s interests, it might just as easily 
encourage ethnic parties that aim to represent the more extreme ends of the political 
spectrum.  Insofar as those parties polarise society, electoral choice will be reduced 
rather than increased. 
 
Critics of the Agreement claim that this is precisely what has happened in Northern 
Ireland (e.g., Horowitz, 2001; Wilson and Wilford, 2003, Taylor, 2006).  In particular, 
they blame STV for the spectacular rise of the two main hard-line parties, Sinn Féin 
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(SF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the equally spectacular decline of 
the two main moderate parties, the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).  More generally, they blame STV for what they see 
as an unhealthy darkening of ethnicity in Northern Irish political life and, alongside 
that, an unhealthy narrowing of the space for cross-cutting social interests.  Thus, as 
Robin Wilson and Rick Wilford conclude, ‘elections have become entirely 
communalised affairs, rewarding intra-ethnic outbidding as the only competition’ 
(Wilson and Wilford, 2003: 7). 
 
Those same critics argue that Northern Ireland would fare much better under the 
alternative vote (AV) electoral system.  Like STV, AV also enables voters to rank 
candidates in order of their preference.  But unlike STV, which operates with a 
relatively low threshold for election, AV operates with a majority threshold.  In highly 
mixed constituencies, a threshold of this latter sort may mean that electoral results 
will turn heavily on vote transfers, which may in turn encourage candidates to take the 
broader view.  This would be good for women, were it not for the fact that there is a 
fatal flaw.  It is very hard to see why hard-liners, whose inclusion in the negotiations 
is generally crucial to the success of any peace agreement, should agree to sign up to 
an electoral system that is explicitly designed to reduce their future chances at the 
polls (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 30-1).   
 
If the critics are misguided on this score, then it may well be that they are also 
misguided in their criticisms of STV.  So let us consider the evidence.5  The critics 
suggest that the rise of SF and the DUP has constricted the space for non-ethnic social 
parties.  If this were the case, then we would be right to worry about the space for 
women to exercise their democratic autonomy along dimension 2.  But the facts tells a 
different story.  Social parties such as the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) 
or the Green Party are not doing badly under STV.  On the contrary, the Green party 
won its first seat in the 2007 Assembly elections.  In those same elections, the APNI 
increased its number of seats from six to seven, and its number of female Assembly 
members from one to two.  Of particular note in the present context is the fact that the 
APNI’s new female Assembly member, Anna Lo, is the first member of the Chinese 
community to win an Assembly seat, which nicely illustrates the ability of STV to 
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capture a wide diversity of social interests, gendered and non-gendered, beyond 
unionism and nationalism. 
 
Turning to dimension 1, there might be some initial cause for concern.  In particular, 
it is tempting to blame the demise of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition on the 
electoral system.  But as I have just suggested, STV seems to serve small parties 
reasonably well.  Indeed, the demise of the NIWC may simply indicate that its former 
supporters have decided that their interests as women are better represented by other 
parties in other ways.  In other words, it may not be a question of the electoral system 
failing women along dimension 1, but possibly of an electoral system which has 
successfully provided women with a range of more attractive political options along 
dimensions 2.  This is not a wholly speculative thought, since the constituency seat 
that Anna Lo now holds (South Belfast) is the same seat that Monica McWilliams, the 
former leader of the NIWC, held until 2003.   
 
The evidence therefore suggests that STV is not making things worse for women 
along dimensions 1 and 2.  Nor, it should be said, is it making things worse for them 
along dimension 3.  For example, the DUP put forward 6 female candidates in 2007 in 
comparison to 4 female candidates in 2003.  In both years, it put forward more female 
candidates than the UUP.  SF continues to put forward fewer women candidates than 
the SDLP.  But of the 9 female candidates put forward by SF in 2007, 8 were elected, 
which suggests that SF is willing to run female candidates in safe constituencies.  Of 
course, no matter how the statistics are read, women are still grossly under-
represented in the Assembly relative to their share of the voting population as a 
whole.  But, as far as dimension 3 is concerned, the argument that STV has made 
things worse for women does not appear to hold up.  At the very least, it would appear 
that hard-liners are just as sensitive to the interests and concerns of their female 
supporters as are their more moderate rivals.   
 
Assembly decision rules 
 
Assuming, then, that STV allows an acceptable degree of space for the recognition 
and accommodation of women’s interests, judged in terms of our three dimensions of 
democratic autonomy, does the same hold true of the rules and procedures by which 
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decisions are taken in the Assembly? As we will now see, the picture that emerges is 
much more mixed. 
 
Take, to begin with, the issue of designation.  The Agreement contains strong veto 
points designed to ensure that key decisions such as budget allocations or changes to 
standing orders are taken on an inter-ethnic basis.  More specifically, all important 
decisions may be passed under the ‘parallel consent’ rule, which requires, among 
those present and voting, an overall majority of Assembly members and a majority of 
both unionists and nationalist members; or, alternatively, they may be taken under the 
‘weighted majority’ rule, which requires, among those present and voting, at least 60 
per cent of all members voting, plus at least 40 per cent of both nationalists and 
unionist members (Agreement, Strand One, para. 5(d); O’Leary, 1999: 70). 
 
Crucially, in order to ascertain whether these requirements have been met, all 
Assembly members must register upon election as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ 
(Agreement, Strand One, para. 6).  Yet while these measures are intended to ensure 
that one group cannot dominate or tyrannise the other, the net effect of enforcing 
vetoes in this way is that it is more rewarding to be a member of one of the two 
named ethnic groups than of an unaffiliated group such as the APNI or, formerly, the 
NIWC.  In practice, the parallel consent rule implies that once a majority is secured 
within the Assembly, the ‘others’ no longer count; at such a point, all that matters is 
whether or not there is a majority within both ethnic groups.  However, by 
disadvantaging unaffiliated Assembly members in this way, ‘the Agreement violates 
their interest in pursuing politics in their own way on terms of equality with other 
political actors’ (Horowitz, 2002: 195).   
 
Insofar as this analysis is correct, designation favours women who choose to exercise 
their personal autonomy along ethnic lines (i.e., along dimension 3).  But even here 
matters are not straightforward, since those same women might decide to exercise 
their autonomy differently on some other occasion (i.e., along dimensions 1 or 2).  As 
I argued earlier in this article, much of the complexity that attaches to our thinking 
about interests stems from the fact that the same woman can stand in a different 
relation to others, depending on the issue in question.  On one particular issue, a 
woman might be perfectly happy to prioritise her ethnicity.  The Agreement will serve 
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her well.  But on some other issue, she may see herself as having a stronger sense of 
affinity with women in general (dimension 1) or with women and men with whom she 
shares a particular social interest (dimension 2).  Yet the trouble is that these choices 
may not be equally valued, or equally recognised, within the Assembly’s decision 
procedures.  
 
Of course, it is important not to overstate the issue.  So long as the policy proposal 
under discussion is a wholly ethnic issue, it is hard to see why anyone should 
complain.  The issue may simply be of no concern to women who think about their 
interests as gendered interests plain and simple (dimension 1) or as social issues that 
cut across the ethnic divide (dimension 2).  An example might be a change to the rules 
governing the flying of flags on public buildings.  Or again, it is possible to imagine 
an issue in which all women thought about their interests solely from an ethnic 
perspective, under which circumstance they would all be equally protected 
(dimension 3).  For example, a change to Northern Ireland’s constitutional status 
might group women in just such a way.  Yet, by the same token, it is also possible to 
imagine an issue in which no woman thought about her interests in ethnic terms, 
instead thinking about them in gendered terms plain and simple.  Put in relational 
terms, it may well be the case that, on certain issues, men and women differ, no matter 
what their ethnic background (see Song, 2005).   
 
For instance, in June 2000, the Assembly debated a motion to prohibit any future 
proposals to extend the 1967 Abortion Act to Northern Ireland.  During the course of 
the debate, the NIWC tabled an amendment calling for the issue to be referred to the 
Assembly’s Health, Social Services and Public Safety Commitee for further 
disucssion.  The proposed amendment was defeated by 43 votes, and the motion was 
subsequently passed without further amendment (Fearon and Rebouché, 2006: 292; 
ref. to Hansard, 2001).  In the present context, there are two related points about this 
example that stand out.  First, although defeated, the proposed amendment was 
supported unanimously by all 14 female Assembly members.  The fact that they were 
able to vote as women, independently of their respective official designations, 
suggests that they were able to act autonomously in their own right (dimension 1).  
But even so, the fact also remains that their distinct interest in the issue of abortion 
was trumped by the distinct interest of their male colleauges in that issue.  Secondly, 
 17 
most of those who voted against the amendment and in support of the motion ‘chose 
to focus on the so-called rights of the unborn rather than on women’s health’ (Fearon 
and Rebouché, 2006: 292-93).  But in so doing, they seemingly discounted the fact 
that a woman’s concern for her own well-being gives her not just a distinct interest in 
abortion, but strong grounds for claiming that her interest in abortion should be 
appropriately protected. 
 
This last sentence requires comment.  In suggesting that her interest in the issue of 
abortion should be appropriately protected, I am not implying that that interest is 
grounded in some underlying pre-political essence.6  As I noted earlier, there is no 
necessary correlation between the ontological view that one holds and the policies that 
one advocates.  It is, after all, possible to think about interests in relational terms 
while at the same time advocating policies that rigidly protect those interests.  We 
might, for example, think that unionism and nationalism are most sensibly understood 
in relational terms, but that unionism and nationalism should nevertheless be 
expressly protected at the level of the state.  Our understanding of the context is 
everything here, which brings me to a second important point. 
 
As I also noted earlier, women’s interests are vast and varied.  But since they are so 
varied, we may want to consider paying special attention to those strikingly unusual 
cases in which the female members of a deeply divided society speak with one voice.  
Sometimes, when the members of an ethnic group speak with one voice, we treat this 
as a sign that their fundamental interests are at stake or that old injustices have 
resurfaced, and often go to great lengths to protect them, for example, by providing 
them with vetoes.  Naturally, much will depend on the context and in particular on 
what we know about the treatment meted out to members in the past—whether they 
have been discriminated against historically, whether they continue to bear the 
consequences of past injustices, whether equality of opportunity is still a problem, and 
so forth.  But since women also claim that historically they have suffered injustices at 
the hands of men, there is, as Young has argued, a clear case for claiming that women, 
too, should have a right of veto on issues that they deem to be of particular concern to 
them as women (Young, 1990: 184).  After all, the principle of equal consideration of 
interests entails that similar cases should be treated similarly, dissimilar cases 
dissimilarly.   
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Of course, the trouble with this particular line of reasoning is that it seems to place us 
on an extremely slippery slope—insisting that, under some circumstances, women qua 
women should have the right to veto decisions that are of particular concern to them 
seems to commit us to the view that, let us say, left-handers should have a similar 
right to veto decisions that are of particular concern to them.  After all, left-handers 
continue to be discriminated against when it comes, for example, to the design of 
surgical instruments.  Yet it must be obvoius that no functioning democratic system 
could grant a right of veto to each and every group that claimed that its fundamental 
interests were at stake or that it is the victim of unfair discrimination (but see 
Mansbridge, 1999: 635).  Insofar as vetoes make groups realise that they must behave 
fairly towards one another, they can be a friend of democracy; but the greater the 
number of vetoes, the greater the chances are that decision making will stall. 
 
Indeed, matters are even more complicated than this, since they ultimately pose what 
Young terms ‘a paradox of political origins’: who shall decide which groups are to 
have vetoes and under what conditions shall that decision be made? I agree with 
Young that there is no determinate answer to questions of this sort (Young, 1990: 
190).  Or at least there is no determinate answer from within a procedural view of 
democracy.  We are where we are, and so the real challenge is to decide where we 
should go next.  As I have argued in this article, democracy needs to be seen not just 
as an ongoing learning process, but as an ongoing learning process that is consciously 
directed in light of sound political principles.  Those principles are not a panacea: at 
best, each case can only be treated on its merits in a rough and ready way, and every 
decision may well be subject to future challenge or revision.  Yet, as I have also 
argued, although principles such as the principle of personal autonomy can be 
difficult to interpret and apply, they can nevertheless serve as moral beacons that 
direct us, albeit imperfectly, in our efforts to build a better, more egalitarian 
democracy for all. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have offered a number of inter-linking arguments.  To begin with, I 
argued that women’s interests should not be traced to some underlying nature or 
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essence, but should instead be conceived in relational terms.  Yet, as we saw, the 
problem with a relational understanding is that it multiplies women’s interests to such 
an extent that no democratic system could recognise and accommodate them all.  The 
question, then, is how to choose between them democratically.  I have suggested that 
since choosing inevitably involves making value judgements, we should be clear 
about which values we are invoking and why, which principles best express those 
values, and which application is most appropriate in the given context. 
 
As far as the case of Northern Ireland is concerned, I have suggested that the Belfast 
Agreement is not so bad after all.  Its electoral system seems to leave sufficient space 
both for the recognition of women’s interests and for the exercise of their personal 
autonomy.  Its parliamentary structures do not fare quite so well, however.  In 
particular, they raise difficult, if not insoluble, questions not just about the recognition 
and accommodation of women’s interests, but also about the recognition of human 
interests more generally.  That said, I have also stressed the point that no democratic 
system is perfect.  Or, otherwise put, I have stressed the idea that every democratic 
society needs to learn and grow.  Northern Ireland is no different in this respect. 
 
Of course, women face a great many other barriers, besides those that I have 
considered here, in their efforts to have their interests duly recognised.  Those barriers 
come in many different social, economic and political forms (Reynolds, 1999: 550-
57).  But in whatever form, the fact remains that no democratic society can ever rise 
to its full political and even moral maturity until they are torn down once and for all.  
This insight is hardly novel—although John Stuart Mill based certain of his arguments 
on a questionable assumption about the essential unity of male and female natures, he 
clearly thought that the full and equal inclusion of women in political life was 
essential to human improvement generally (Mill, 1991 [1869]: 471, 493-95).  And yet, 
despite the power of this insight, much work remains to be done.   
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comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
2
 Think, for instance, of liberal individualists who nonetheless support the types of 
holist policies that one might normally associate with the welfare state. 
3
 In practice, parties of this sort have sometimes used essentialist rhetoric in order to 
strengthen their political hand; they present themselves as representing all women, not 
just some particular portion of them (whether or not they actually believe their own 
rhetoric is, of course, an altogether different question). But strategies of this sort will 
often backfire, since essentialist rhetoric can have a alienating effect on many women.  
Haslanger, 2000: 46; see Little, 2002, for an example from Northern Ireland.   
4
 Indeed, gender might not even have been the prime motivating factor driving those 
women to engage in politics; gender may ultimately be of lesser importance to them 
than the state of the planet. 
5
 The data presented here is drawn from Queen’s University Belfast’s Centre for 
Advancement of Women in Politics website, available at 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/cawp/UKhtmls/electionNIMarch07.htm, and from the Northern 
Ireland Assembly’s own website, available at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/. 
6
 Nor am I implying that all women think about abortion in the same way.  In the 
example used above, there is no suggestion that the 14 female Assembly members 
were all pro-choice or all anti-abortion.  They all viewed the issue as a healthcare 
issue, they all wished to talk about the issue further, and they all viewed their interest 
in the issue in relation to the interest of men.  But beyond that, we do not know what 
they thought or how internally diverse their views actually were.  Cf. Phillips, 1995: 
68, for a nice insight into these types of distinctions. 
